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I.

INTRODUCTION.
The United States of America currently uses an all-volunteer military force1 to fulfill its ranks

across all branches of the Military, including the Army,2 Air Force, Navy, and Marines. However,
an all-volunteer force has not always been the manner in which the United States raises its forces.
Throughout its history, the United States has enacted several conscription laws to quickly increase
the size of its military forces in a time of war. Compared to some modernized European countries
that rely on conscription through peacetime, the United States has used conscription laws
sparingly, only during wartimes.3
Presently the United States has the Military Selective Service Act (the “Act”) as the current
Selective Service system. Although it is inactive (not presently inducting registrants) it is codified
as 50 U.S.C. § 3801.4 As of this writing, no known objections or challenges have risen to the
Supreme Court to challenge the Act for claims based on religious practices or observations.
The Act defines conscientious objectors as “anyone, who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”5 Further, the term ‘religious
training and belief’ does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or
a merely personal moral code.”6
Challenges have been made to previous Selective Service Acts, primarily in the time of the
Vietnam War.7 Those cases challenged the narrow interpretation of the definition of conscientious

92 P.L. 129, 85 Stat. 348 (1971).
Dixon, Alex, July Marks 40th Anniversary of All-Volunteer Army, (Jul. 2, 2013),
https://www.army.mil/article/106813/july_marks_40th_anniversary_of_all_volunteer_army.
3
See Finland Ministy of Defense, Conscription Act, (Jan. 1, 2008),
https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2007/en20071438.pdf.
4
50 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq.
5
50 U.S.C.S. § 3806(j) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through Public Law 116-65, approved October 9, 2019).
6
Id.
7
See e.g., (United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
1
2
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objections, particularly that the exemptions should apply broadly.8 However, what is seldom
challenged, is whether those Selective Service Acts violated the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses.9 Further, no challenge has been brought under the Act to test the current construction of
exemptions for conscientious objectors. This Note will assess the outcome of a challenge against
the Military Selective Service Act as a violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Additionally, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) was introduced by Congress
in 1993,10 and no challenge has been brought under the RFRA asserting that the Act violates the
RFRA. This Note will examine the hypothetical scenario in which a challenge is brought under
the RFRA if no exception existed for conscientious objectors under the RFRA. The result will
determine whether an exception for conscientious objectors is required under the RFRA, if an
exemption had not existed at the outset.
This Note argues that the Act is constitutional under the Religion Clauses. It does not facially
violate the Establishment Clause because the statute accommodates all religions and beliefs
equally by not promoting or inhibiting any one religion. It also meets the requirements of the Free
Exercise Clause and the RFRA. By incorporating different opportunities such as alternate service
and noncombatant training, no individual, regardless of type of sincerely held belief, will have to
choose between their religion and violating a federal law. Accordingly, the statute does not
presently violate the RFRA as currently constructed. If no exception existed for conscientious
objectors, the Act may in fact violate the RFRA for certain traditional or orthodox religions, but
not for non-traditional claims. The RFRA would then require that an exemption be written into
the Act.

8

Id.
U.S. Const. amend. I.
10
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2019).
9
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II.

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACTS, HISTORICAL TO MODERN DAY.
It is important to first view the history of Selective Service in the United States to understand

the evolution of the treatment of conscientious objectors. This historical view will highlight how
conscientious objectors were defined, how they were treated, and who could qualify for the
exemption from war to war, eventually ending with the current definition and exemption in the
Act. With the evolution of the Selective Service laws and an understanding of how conscientious
objectors have been defined, a thorough analysis can then be applied to the Act to determine if it
violates pillars of First Amendment Jurisprudence.
A.

The Historical Selective Service Acts.

The United States enacted its first conscription law in the Civil War during the Thirty-Seventh
Congress in 1863.11 The United States’ first draft law12 made all able-bodied males between the
ages of twenty and forty-five eligible to be called on for military service.13 If a male in that agerange was called on through conscription, they were required to report for armed service, or violate
Federal Law.14 The general proclamation did contain exceptions and exemptions for those called
on to serve. None of the listed exemptions, however, noted or even referenced conscientious
objectors, or those opposed to war.15 It appears that the Enrollment Act of 1863 required even
those opposing war based on their religious beliefs to partake in the draft and serve in the armed
forces of the Union, if called upon.16

11

12 Stat. 731, 37 Cong. Ch. 75 (1863).
Note that in 1863, this only constituted those residing in states within the Union during the Civil War.
13
See 12 Stat. 731, 37 Cong. Ch. 75 (1863).
14
Federal Law of the Union only.
15
Id.
16
One caveat, however, is that substitutions were allowed, and if a valid substitution was provided, that individual
would be relieved of service duties while the substitution performed service.
12
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In 1917, for World War I, all male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and thirty were
eligible to be drafted into the armed forces as part of the selective service system.17 In this selective
service law, religious exemptions first appeared. In 1917 exemptions existed for individuals “who
[are] found to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present
organized and existing and whose creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in
any form.”18 However, conscientious objectors were not exempted from noncombatant service and
training, and were required to serve in some capacity.19
In 1940, for World War II, all male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six were
eligible to be drafted into the armed forces as part of the selective service system.20 In this 1940
law, exemptions existed for conscientious objectors who were defined as “any person … who, by
reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.”21 A notable change from the 1917 Act is that the exemption was no longer based on a wellrecognized religion, but rather by assessing the individual’s belief determined by the duties that
God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct; and that “there is a higher loyalty than loyalty
to this country, loyalty to God.” 22 This change in 1940 recognized a broader understanding of the
exemption, but is still narrow as it requires an official God in a religion in order to recognize and
exemption. As in 1917, a conscientious objector may be placed in a noncombatant role.23

65 P.L. 12, 40 Stat. 76, 65 Cong. Ch. 15 (1917).
Id.
19
Id.
20
76 P.L. 783, 54 Stat. 885, 76 Cong. Ch. 720 (1940); see also 50 U.S.C. Appendix, § 301 et seq. (1940) (repealed)
21
Id.
22
Id. See also Seeger, 380 U.S. at 171-172.
23
Id.
17
18
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In 1940 Herman Berman registered under the Selective Service Act of 1940 and requested to
be classified as a conscientious objector.24 Berman’s views were not based on a traditional
religious belief, but on his philosophical and political viewpoints.25 Berman argued that a person’s
philosophical and political viewpoints caused him to be opposed to war in any form and he should
therefore qualify as a conscientious objector under the Selective Service Act of 1940.26 He further
argued that his conscience and his devotion to human welfare should give him the classification
of a conscientious objector under the Selective Service Act of 1940.27 The Ninth Circuit, however,
disagreed, finding that the phrase “by reason of religious training and belief” was clear in that it
distinguished between a conscientious social belief or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic
philosophy and an objection based upon an individual’s belief in his responsibility to a higher
authority.28 The Ninth Circuit further stated that “there is not a shred of evidence in this case to
the effect that appellant relates his way of life or his objections to war to any religious training or
belief.”29 Here, it was clear that this objection was not from the basis of religious training in any
manner, but was rather a philosophical view on life and war.30 Although an anti-war belief may be
sincere, that alone does not qualify the belief for the exemption, it must be based on religious
training or belief,31 which Berman could not produce any evidence of. Therefore, Berman was not
granted an exemption a conscientious objector.32

Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), 329 U.S. 795 cert. denied ; see also 50 U.S.C. Appendix, §
301 et seq. (1940) (repealed).
25
Berman, 156 F.2d at 378 (9th Cir. 1946).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Berman, 156 F.2d at 380.
29
Id. at 381.
30
Id. at 382.
31
50 U.S.C. Appendix, § 301(5)(g) (1940) (repealed).
32
Berman, 156 F.2d at 382.
24
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In the Vietnam War, all males residing in the United States between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six were required to register with the Selective Service system as part of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1948.33 Section 456(j) of the 1948 Act exempted from
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who by
reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form.34 However, the legislature went further to include that “the term ‘religious training and
belief’ does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely
personal code.”35 Notably, Congress changed the language of 456(j) in the 1948 Act to include
those whose religious training and belief was to be defined as "an individual's belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being, involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.”36 The
change signified a move from the word God in the 1940 Act, to Supreme Being in the 1948 Act.
The chronology shows that with each iteration of the law, the exemption was slowly being
expanded, but it would require careful analysis by the courts to determine what Congress actually
intended when it changed God to Supreme Being. Again in 1948, as in previous editions, a
conscientious objector may be assigned to noncombatant service, or, if he is found to be
conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, will be ordered to such
civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety.37
Two decades after the passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, cases rose
to the Supreme Court to resolve ambiguous language in the law as it relates to conscientious
objectors.38 Three prominent cases appeared on the Supreme Court’s docket that would quickly

50 U.S.C. § 453 et seq. (1948) (repealed); see also 90 P.L. 40, 81 Stat. 104 (1967).
50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1948) (repealed).
35
Id.
36
Id. See also Seeger, 380 U.S. at 172.
37
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
38
50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1958 ed.) (repealed).
33
34
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shape the understanding of how conscientious objectors would be defined moving forward by
determining what Congress intended by the change from God to Supreme Being in the 1948 Act.
In United States v. Seeger, the Court took on the question of what sort of belief[s] can warrant
consideration for a conscientious objection under the Universal Military Training and Service Act
in section 456(j).39 Specifically, the parties,40 who did not hold traditional pacifist religious beliefs
but rather moral beliefs about war in general,41 argued that section 456(j) is unconstitutional
because the conscientious objections exemption does not allow nonreligious conscientious
objectors in violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.42 The Court stated that the
expression “Supreme Being” rather than the designation “God” in the 1948 Act broadened the
exemption to incude religious training and belief to embrace all religions whether traditional or
not and to exclude political, sociological, or philosophical views.43 The Court came to this
understanding following a review of the Congressional intent of 50 U.S.C. § 456(j), where it was
determined that Congress intended the phrase Supreme Being to replace God in the 1948 Act in
order to reflect diverse sects in the United States and broaden the scope of conscientious objection
exemptions.44
Further, the Court created and then emphasized the use of the “parallel belief” test in
determining whether a person’s sincere and meaningful belief(s) occupy a place in the life of its
possessor a belief system that is parallel to that of an orthodox religion’s belief to God.45 The Court
then found that the conscientious objector challengers did hold sincere religious beliefs, based on

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
Seeger is a consolidated case of three separate actions raising the same legal question.
41
Seeger in particular beliefs focused on ethical and moral opposition to war.
42
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 174-176 (discussing Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946)).
45
Id. at 166.
39
40
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religious training and belief in relation to God that were not essentially based on political,
sociological, or philosophical views.46 Importantly, the Court emphasized that this parallel belief
test avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some
and excluding others in line with the Religion Clauses.47
Five years later, in Welsh v. United States the Court took on another case regarding the
interpretation of sincerely held beliefs for conscientious objectors under section 456(j).48 Here,
Welsh argued that his belief, which is purely ethical and morally based, entitled him to
conscientious objection exemption.49 Welsh was opposed to war in any form based on his desire
to benefit the welfare of humanity and that belief would be in opposition with military service
which he viewed as futile and self-defeating, and that from a moral standpoint, war is unethical.50
The Court returned to the parallel belief test that it created five years prior in Seeger v. United
States.51 In finding that Welsh’s beliefs were sincere and were not essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical, the Court stated that “those who fall outside the exemption are those
whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest on moral, ethical,
or religious principle but policy, pragmatism, or expediency.”52 Welsh clearly did not base his
objections on policy, pragmatism, or expediency when he stated that “human life is valuable,
therefore I will not injure or kill another human being.”53 The Court elaborated that section 456(j)
required no more than to demonstrate that a nonorthodox belief such as deeply held moral or ethical
beliefs are held with the conviction of those with beliefs in an orthodox religion.54 The importance

46

Id. at 187-188.
Id. at 176.
48
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
49
Id. at 335.
50
Id. at 338.
51
Id. at 339.
52
Id. at 342-343.
53
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343.
54
Id. at 343-344.
47
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of Welsh v. United States highlights the practical effect of the parallel position test to God that
even non-theistic or agnostic views can satisfy the conscientious objection exemption under the
1948 Act if there is a belief that holds a resemblance to the view and relation of God in a traditional
belief.
Only one year later Gillette v. United States,55 another consolidated case, appeared on the
Court’s docket regarding conscientious objectors under section 456(j)56 of the Act.57 Here, the
petitioner’s claimed they should be exempted from induction into military service as a
conscientious objector because the Vietnam War was an unjust war, and they were therefore
opposed to just this war.58 The Court, however, was quick to differentiate between those with
deeply held views based on religious training or belief that were opposed to all wars because of
their religious belief or training and those who were simply opposed to a particular or singular
war.59 Reviewing Congressional intent, it was clear that section 456(j) was intended to protect
conscientious objectors who opposed all war, not those involving opposition to a particular war
only.60 Here, it is clear and obvious that these petitioners’ claims are not based on religious training
or belief that put them in opposition with war in general, but rather only in opposition to the
Vietnam War, which does not align with the exemptions in section 456(j).61
As the Vietnam War wound down, the need to induct individuals into military service
decreased and the United States moved to an all-volunteer military force.62 Although there are

The petitioners additionally asserted claims that section 456(j) violated the free exercise and establishment
clauses, which will be addressed in Section III.
56
Note that under all three cases section 456(j) of the Act reflects the 1948 Act where Congress officially designated
Supreme Being rather than God in the 1948 Act, leading to the challenge and decision in United States v. Seeger.
57
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
58
Id. at 437.
59
Id. at 439.
60
Id. at 446.
61
Id. at 447.
62
Public Law 19-129 (1971).
55
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current laws regarding Selective Service, which include strong protections for conscientious
objectors, cases have not come across the Supreme Court’s docket since the Vietnam War.63 That
leaves the three prior cases as the last significant Supreme Court cases to clarify the treatment of
conscientious objectors and how to determine if there is or is not a deeply and sincerely held belief
held by an individual that warrants classification as a conscientious objector.
B.

The Military Selective Service Act.

Currently, the Act is codified as 50 U.S.C. § 3801.64 Although the Selective Service system is
not presently inducting individuals for military service, its provisions are in place in the event that
a draft is implemented. This law allows conscientious objectors to be exempt from combat military
service when:
“a registrant’s objection [is] founded on religious training and belief;
it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs
that are purely ethical or moral in source or content and occupy in the
life of a registrant a place parallel to that filled by belief in a Supreme
Being for those holding more traditionally religious views.”65
As in prior Selective Service laws, conscientious objectors are allowed opportunities for
noncombative service opportunities, labeled as alternative service options.66
This current Act is further laid out in Federal Regulations.67 These regulations clarify the
protections afforded to conscientious objectors and how their beliefs or views will be assessed to

But see Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2005) (Denying an active servicemember’s desire to be
considered a conscientious objector before deployment when no mention of his religious beliefs or desire to be a
conscientious objector existed before his orders to deploy); Hanna v. Sec'y of the Army, 513 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2008)
(No basis in fact to deny conscientious objection exemption when claimants objections stem from religious
convictions); Watson v. Geren, 569 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (No basis in fact for a finding of a denial of a
conscientious objection exemption).
64
50 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq.
65
32 C.F.R. § 1636.3 et seq.
66
32 C.F.R. 1630.11; 32 C.F.R. § 1630.16.
67
32 C.F.R. § 1636.6.
63
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determine their future service.68 The regulations also state the role of the Selection Board in
determining how a conscientious objector is evaluated.69
An individual does not need to be a member of a traditional peace church or a specific religion
to qualify.70 However, if an individual does identify that their beliefs are those of a traditional
church or religious organization that individual must show that his beliefs adhere to that specific
church or religious organization, whether he is affiliated with the institution or not.71 The Board
may inquire into a specified church or organization if the individual identifies the church or
religious organization when claiming a conscientious objection.72
When an individual is not claiming a conscientious objection based on a traditional claim,73
but the claim is based primarily on moral or ethical principles, Federal Regulations adopted and
continue to employ the parallel belief test created by the Supreme Court.74 Further, the individual
does not need to use any formal or conventional language when describing the non-traditional
objection.75 Finally, and importantly, the Board cannot reject beliefs and claims of conscientious
objections because they find them incomprehensible or inconsistent with their own beliefs.76
The current construction of the Act was clearly guided by the Court’s opinions and
interpretations of the historical acts. The historical evolution demonstrates how the Act is and was
guided by shortcomings of prior acts, particularly by defining religious beliefs too narrowly. Now,
the exemptions for conscientious objectors are broad in scope. Even though Congress has not

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id. at § 1636.6(b); compare with Pub. L. 65–12, 40 Stat. 76 (1917) (requiring an individual to be a member of a
well-recognized religious sect or organization whose principals oppose participation in war in any form).
71
Id.
72
32 C.F.R. § 1636.3(d).
73
See Pub. L. 65–12, 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
74
See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
75
32 C.F.R. § 1636.3(f).
76
Id.
69
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enacted the Act to induct individuals into service, litigation has been few and far between
challenging the Act against the Religion Clauses showing that its construction may have struck the
appropriate balance in defining conscientious objectors and their respective views.
III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The treatment of Establishment Clause cases in the United States vary. Although the Religion

Clauses can, and do, intersect, the Court has laid out different tests for the Free Exercise Clause
and Establishment Clause. Establishment Clause cases are traditionally funneled through the test
set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.77 Free Exercise Clause cases are traditionally brought under the
strict scrutiny standard of review under Sherbert v. Verner.78 This section will address a
hypothetical challenge to the Act claiming that it violates the Establishment Clause.
The Establishment Clause guarantees that Congress shall pass no law respecting an
establishment of religion.79 In Lemon, the Court was posed with the question of whether
government aid to religious schools violated the Establishment Clause.80 The Establishment
Clause ensures no government sponsorship, financial support, or entanglement with religion.81 The
Court therefore set out a three-prong test to determine if the Establishment Clause was violated.82
The three-prong test was created to assess whether the statute has a secular purpose, whether the
principal or primary effect inhibits or advances religion, and whether there is government
entanglement with religion.83

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
See Sherbert v. Verner, 474 U.S. 398, (1963). Note that the RFRA restored that primacy of this decision to be the
controlling analysis for Free Exercise claims.
79
U.S. Const. amend. I.
80
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
81
Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
82
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613.
83
Id.
77
78
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In assessing the secular purpose prong, the Court looked to legislative history to quickly
conclude there was no legislative intent to advance religion and was rather to enhance the quality
of secular education, thus the first prong was satisfied.84 In assessing the effects prong of whether
religion was advanced or inhibited, the Court again looked to the legislative history and concluded
that there was no intent to advance or inhibit any religion.85
The entanglement prong86 of the test required a more detailed assessment because total
separation of church and state is not possible in an absolute sense, as some relationship between
the two is inevitable.87 Rather, “the objective is to prevent the intrusion of either the church or state
into the precincts of the other.”88 Further explaining the aim of the excessive entanglement prong
the Court stated that “we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority.”89
The Court had a prior opportunity to elaborate on the excessive entanglement analysis in Walz
v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York in 1970.90 In Walz, the Court stated the entanglement prong is
a test of degree of entanglement.91 There the Court reasoned that taking away tax exemptions for
religious-held properties would actually increase government entanglement by giving rise to tax
valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and direct conflicts with religious

Id. at 613.
Id.
86
In Lemon, the Court found that both the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes violate the third prong, and
therefore the establishment clause, because there was clear entanglement between church and state aid, such as
religious teachers teaching secular subjects, the handbook referring to the synodal law, and the school being
presided over by a religious figure.
87
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
88
Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
89
Id. at 615.
90
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
91
Id. at 674.
84
85
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establishments.92 Further, the grant of a tax exemption is not government sponsorship of religion
because no revenue is transferred to the church or religious institution, but rather abstains from
demanding that the church support the state.93 Finally, the Court concluded that although there is
minimal and remote involvement between church and state, that relationship is fine here as it serves
a purpose to restrict that relationship and reinforce the desired separation between the two, as
separation does not require absence of all contact.94
A.

The Conscientious Objection Exemption Does Not Violate the Establishment
Clause

To assess whether the conscientious objection exemption violates the Lemon test, we first ask
whether the exemption has a secular purpose.
Here, the secular purpose prong is clearly satisfied as the conscientious objection exemption
promotes social stability as well as religious freedom, which is a civil right.
The second prong of the test slightly mirrors the first prong, in assessing whether the law at
issue promotes or inhibits religion. 95 There is no promotion or inhibition of religion in the Military
Selective Service Act. The Act’s regulations make clear that the Board members are not free to
reject beliefs because they find them incomprehensible or inconsistent with their own beliefs.96
One of the possible ways in which a religion may be inhibited or promoted is if a Board member
departs from their obligations and favors or disfavors one religion. In the event of that occurrence,
the individual on the Board would be violating the challenger’s First Amendment protections under
the Establishment Clause.

92

Id.
Id. at 675.
94
Id. at 676.
95
Id.
96
32 C.F.R. § 1636.6(f).
93
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Individuals challenging prong two of the test may find difficulty, as all religions, religious
training, or beliefs are considered, as long as they are sincere and in opposition to war and combat
training in any form.97 The law on its face does not discriminate against any one religion, nor does
it promote any one religion. The law is carefully drafted to steer clear of Establishment Clause
violations. In fact, the petitioner in Gillette v. United States attempted to make that very argument
challenging that the 1948 Act violated the Establishment Clause by favoring traditional religions
over his beliefs.98 Not only did the petitioner fail on other grounds, the Court was quick to strike
down that argument, noting that the objection must have a grounding in "religious training and
belief," which he did not, but no particular sectarian affiliation or theological position is required,99
therefore neither favoring or inhibiting any religion, and satisfying prong two of the test.
The third prong requires the assessment of whether the law excessively entangles the
government and church. 100 Here, it is abundantly clear that allowing conscientious objectors to be
placed into alternate service or noncombatant training serves the purpose of separating church and
state, rather than entangling the two. If the Board had to treat each individual objector separately
and individually, by placing restrictions on their military involvement and training once inducted
under the Act, the government would quickly become excessively entangled in each respective
objector’s religion. By allowing exceptions for conscientious objectors to be placed into alternate
service or noncombatant training, the spheres of influence of church and state only touch
tangentially, not intertwine impermissibly.101

50 U.S.C.S. § 3806(j).
Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450.
99
Id.at 451.
100
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
101
One potential argument to be made is that allowing exceptions at all for conscientious objectors is a violation of
the establishment clause in itself. That argument fails for two reasons. First, the Walz opinion already concluded
that there can be minimal involvement of church and state if the purpose of the law is to restrict the two and
reinforce the separation between them, which is clearly the purpose here. Second, there would be an overt violation
of the free exercise clause and that argument would fail by violating the free exercise clause under Sherbert.
97
98
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It is clear that the conscientious objection exemption of the Act does not violate the
Establishment Clause. The Act satisfies the three-prong test and will not impermissibly promote
or inhibit any one religion.
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN STATUTE, THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT.
This section will assess whether the RFRA requires the conscientious objection exemption

under the strict scrutiny analysis by examining a hypothetical challenge to the Act under the RFRA
if there were no such exemption available under the Act.102 The RFRA follows the traditional
analysis the Supreme Court enacted to test whether the Free Exercise Clause has been violated.103
Similar to the analysis of whether the Free Exercise Clause has been violated, the RFRA asks
whether the law at issue substantially burdens an individual’s ability to exercise their religion.104
If the law does substantialy burden a person’s exercise of religion, the next question is whether it
furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of accomplishing
that interest. If the law does not further those interests then the law should be invalidated as a
violation of RFRA.105 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court was posed with a challenge asserting that
denying a person unemployment compensation benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause. The
question was whether the state could burden an individual’s exercise of religion without furthering
a compelling government interest.106 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court stated that if there is a
compelling government interest, such as public safety, peace or order, an individual’s exercise of
religion may be burdened.107

U.S. Const. amend. I.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2019).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See Sherbert, 474 U.S. 398.
107
Id. at 403.
102
103
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However, before diving into the challenge under the RFRA, it is important to take note of how
and why the RFRA exists, as well as what would happen to this hypothetical challenge if the RFRA
did not exist. In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, the Court abandoned
the strict scrutinty analysis in Sherbert and stated that if a law was facially neutral towards religion
and generally applicable the government or state would be able to substantially burden a persons’s
exercise of religion.108 Although the RFRA was created to overrule the Smith opinion, it is still
essential to cover its breadth, as Smith was controlling law until 1993, and would be controlling if
the RFRA was ever repealed or ruled unconstitutional in its entirety. For that occurrence, the
analysis shifts to Justice Scalia’s 1990 opinion in Smith.
A.
Challenging the Act Under Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon
v. Smith.
It is clear and obvious that a deeply held and sincere belief, based on a religion or religious
training, that opposes an individual to combat training or participation in war in any form allows
that individual to be classified as a conscientious objector under the Act.109 It is further clear that
if an individual qualifies as a conscientious objector, it would be a substantial burden to their
exercise of religion to induct them into combat training regardless of their objections.
Imagine that the Act did not contain an exemption for conscientious objectors. Under Smith,
a law that is facially neutral and generally applicable is constitutional even if it burdens a person’s
exercise of religion.110 The implication of Smith would be that no court would have to require a
conscientious objection exemption in the Act because it is facially neutral and generally applicable.
In short, the only means of relief for conscientious objectors would be through the legislature.
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Theoretically, from the date of the Smith opinion in 1990, to the passage of the RFRA in 1993,
and if the RFRA is ever repealed or deemed unconstitutional as a whole, Smith would be the
controlling law for deferential reviews of religiously neutral laws of general applicability.
Therefore, as a facially neutral law of general applicability, the Act would not be required to create
exemptions for conscientious objectors. In this hypothetical world, and the real world from 1990
to 1993, a conscientious objector may have been required to abide by their induction into the
military for the purpose of combat training if so ordered. Although there is a long historical
precedent in the United States of respecting conscientious objectors and the law would have likely
retained the exemptions for their objections, Smith would not have required exemptions for
conscientious objectors at all.
Under Smith, the Act would likely be categorized as a neutral law of general applicability and
would therefore receive a deferential review by the courts.111 Under the deferential review, the Act
would likely not need to include an exception for conscientious objectors. The law would be
upheld because the government does not need a compelling interest as it does under Sherbert, but
rather only a rational basis for justifying the law. Here, there is a strong argument for why the Act
serves a rational basis for the United States for the purpose of the common defense of the
country.112
However, in 2019, Smith is not controlling law, and the principals of stare decisis and the
RFRA require that Sherbert is followed for Free Exercise claims.
B.

The RFRA Was Created to Restore the Compelling Interest Test.

See Smith 494 U.S. 872.
See U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8 (The Congress shall have Power To … provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States), (To raise and Support Armies), (To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces), and (To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper).
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In 1993, Congress passed the RFRA in response to Smith.113 The RFRA provides that “laws
‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise; and governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification.”114 Further, the purpose of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is to
“restore the compelling interest test115 and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by the government.”116
The RFRA provides that the government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of generally applicability.117 However, the
government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
the application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.118
Two seminal cases by the Court control when a person’s exercise has been burdened, thus
triggering a violation of the RFRA.119 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, a person’s exercise of religion is
burdened when the state or government “compel[s] an individual, under threat of criminal
sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenants of their religious beliefs.”120
For the purposes of this Note, the burden discussed in Yoder, facing criminal sanctions or choosing
person’s exercise of religion, is on point for the current discussion of the Act.
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The first part of the analysis under the RFRA requires a court to determine whether an
individual’s exercise of religion has been burdened. In Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec.
Div. a Jehovah’s Witness claim for unemployment benefits was denied when he claimed that he
could not participate in the manufacture of steel that would lead to the production of arms and
weapons for military use.121 In overturning the denial of unemployment benefits the Court stated
that the State will be found to have placed a substantial burden on an individual’s exercise of
religion when they pressure an individual to violate his beliefs or modify his behavior and beliefs
to conform to the law.122 The Court found that Thomas’ exercise of his religion was substantially
burdened by denying him unemployment compensation or requiring him to modify his pacifist
beliefs in order to receive the unemployment benefits.123
The next step is to address whether there is a compelling government interest to justify
burdening a person’s exercise of religion. The Court has had limited opportunities to determine
whether the government interest is compelling. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court stated that
the government must demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through the
application of the challenged law to the person.124 However, the Court then stated that they
assumed the issue was satisfied and would not dive further into the requirement of compelling
government interests.125 For the purposes of this Note, it is also assumed that inducting individuals
through selective service is a very compelling government interest.126
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The third step in the analysis is to make a determination of whether the government has
employed the least restrictive means in substantially burdening a person’s religion through their
compelling interest. The Court has elaborated on the least restrictive means standard.127 In Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had already implemented
other means to provide contraceptives, as it already provides nonprofit entities with a workaround
to avoid the contraceptive mandate.128 Simply, if other means exist, such as subsidizing the cost
as in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that are less restrictive on a person’s exercise of religion, the
government will fail to meet its burden under the second prong of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.129
C.

The RFRA Requires an Exception for Conscientious Objectors.

As the hypothetical case study described earlier, imagine the scenario in which a challenge is
brought under the RFRA if no exception existed for conscientious objectors under the RFRA. For
this scenario to exist, an individual would have to be inducted for military service under the Act.130
That individual would then be required to report for military service regardless of any religious
training or beliefs that oppose them to all war.131 The question is thus posed in this hypothetical
challenge under the RFRA as whether inducting any individual into military service under the Act
violates the RFRA because it substantially burdens a person’s religion.
To establish a claim under the RFRA a Plaintiff must demonstrate that the activities
substantially burdened by the government must be an exercise of religion and that burden must be
substantial.132 To get out of the gate, a Plaintiff must show that they have religious beliefs and
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practices and that their exercise of religion has been substantially burdened as set out in Hobby
Lobby and Thomas. If a Plaintiff can satisfy those two elements, the burden shifts to the
government to prove that the government action is in furtherance of a compelling interest and it is
the least restrictive means of achieving that compelling interest.133
There are two ways this challenge can proceed, one with an orthodox religious claim and one
with a non-orthodox claim. For the former orthodox claim, the hypothetical challenger will be a
Quaker,134 a member of a traditional peace church. For the non-orthodox claim, the facts of Gillette
will be used.135
Starting with the Quaker challenger, it is assumed that being inducted into selective service
would put the individual in direct conflict with their religious training and beliefs,136 as a member
of a traditional and historic peace church. Under Wisconsin v. Yoder, a person’s exercise of
religion is burdened when the government “compel[s] an individual, under threat of criminal
sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenants of their religious beliefs.”137
As it is clear that this individuals exercise of religion will be burdened and that this burden will be
substantial,138 the burden will shift to the government to prove that the government action is in
furtherance of a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that compelling
interest.139
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It is undeniable that Congress has the authority to enact the Act.140 It is further clear that
inducting individuals into military service in a time of war is a compelling government interest,
possibly even stronger than providing contraceptives in Burwell.141 However, the issue that arises
here, in this hypothetical challenge, is whether inducting individuals into military service
regardless of their religious beliefs is the least restrictive means of achieving that compelling
interest. The answer, unequivocally, must be no. The United States has strong First Amendment
protections, and in conjunction with the RFRA, Congress must manufacture a less restrictive way
to burden an individual’s exercise of religion. Here, the Quaker challenger would likely succeed
because the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling state interest would be to place the
individual in alternative service or noncombatant training.142 Therefore, in the hypothetical
scenario in which no exceptions for conscientious objectors existed, a challenge under the RFRA
would require Congress to include exceptions and exemptions for conscientious objectors in the
Act.
Moving to the latter of the two scenarios, in which a non-orthodox challenge is brought under
the RFRA, such as in Gillette,143 where no exceptions exist for conscientious objectors, the result
may be different. Using the facts from Gillette, the individual claims they should be exempted
from induction into military service as a conscientious objector because the war is an unjust war,
and they were therefore opposed to just this war.144 However, because this claim of conscientious
objection is based off of a moral belief to one war in particular this may not satisfy the first prong
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of an RFRA claim.145 Additionally, conscientious objectors are defined as anyone, who, by reason
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.146
Using that definition and construction, as seen in the Gillette opinion, a non-orthodox claim for
classification as a conscientious objector would still fail, even with additional protections of the
RFRA, because the claim is only based upon a moral belief in opposition to one war, not war in
any form.
There is an opportunity for wiggle room, however. If a challenger came forward with an RFRA
claim against the Act for burdening their exercise of religion that was sincere and not based on
moral views to one war alone as in Gillette, they would likely fall into the same result as the Quaker
challenger, as opposed to the latter challenge.147 In that situation, as long as the moral belief is in
opposition to all war, the burden would switch to the government and the result would likely be
that a less restrictive means of raising a military force is available, by including exceptions for
conscientious objectors. Therefore, even non-traditional or historic religious beliefs would force
the RFRA to require an exemption, as in the hypothetical challenge from a member of the Quakers.
The outcome here is that under the RFRA, the Act must include an exception for conscientious
objectors. If there was no exceptions available, Congress would be required to write an exception
for conscientious objectors into Act because it is clearly the least restrictive means available to
achieve the government’s compelling government interest of raising a military force for the
defense of the country.148
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V.

CONCLUSION
The Act is constitutional under the Religion Clauses.

It does not facially violate the

Establishment Clause because the statute accommodates all religions and beliefs equally by not
promoting or inhibiting any one religion. It also meets the requirements of the Free Exercise
Clause and RFRA. By incorporating different opportunities such as alternate service and
noncombatant training, no individual, regardless of type of sincerely held belief will never have to
choose between their religion and violating a federal law. Accordingly, the statute does not violate
the RFRA because no individual is coerced to act contrary to their religious belief by the threat of
civil or criminal sanctions under this federal law, because exceptions such as alternative service
options exist for conscientious objectors. However, if no exception existed for conscientious
objectors, the Act may in fact violate the RFRA and the First Amendment.
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